

WIRING TELEGRAM

Department of State

EX-101

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Control: 9965

Rec'd: March 14, 1960

11:53 p.m.

FROM: Habana

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2370, March 14, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2370; REPEATED INFORMATION [REDACTED]

BI, EB

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[REDACTED] informed me March 11 he was suggesting to some Latin American colleagues that they make point of mentioning to Foreign Minister Roa their concern at Cuba-US tension. I expressed interest and requested he keep me informed.

BI, EB

Last night [REDACTED] came to my house following long (#) in introduced by executive or represents executive position. [REDACTED] said he pointed out to Roa recent conciliatory press statements by Herter). Roa had accurately described to [REDACTED] meeting to which he summoned me on March 8 and had said that Castro had specifically directed that I be treated with courtesy and restraint since "American Charge has done nothing personally to add fuel, to flames". [REDACTED] said he had urged Roa to send us GOC's suggested agenda for discussions and believes we should show conciliatory spirit by accepting GOC assurances that no accusation intended against Ambassador Bonsal. [REDACTED] willing as before to help promote a friendly settlement and still sees himself in possible role of mediator. I told [REDACTED] that in my judgment Cuban agreement with Soviet Union and recent charge of US complicity in ship explosion had introduced new elements in situation and that I would have to consult Department as to whether we wished actively to seek a reconciliation. I said it my impression we were now considering our Cuban policy more in light of its effect rest of Latin America than Cuba itself. [REDACTED] at once replied he too was thinking in

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-2- 2370, March 14, 5 p.m., from Habana

hemisphere terms and not just about Cuba, for which he "didn't care a radish". He said he had no illusions that US would be able to come to definitive satisfactory terms with Castro regime headed toward Communism and Castro himself dangerously unbalanced. [REDACTED] believes temporary rapprochement feasible, however, and that Latin America would want us not to leave any possibility for friendly settlement unexplored. For US to be "victim" of Cuba's excesses and abuse was best way he thought to overcome Latin American predisposition to side with weak American republic against powerful US. [REDACTED] very definite that to modify our policy of patience and restraint now in favor of tough policy would be tactical error. B1, EB

Department's thinking on subject's herein discussed would be appreciated. One advantage of conciliatory course even if very transitory would be that it would facilitate Bonal's return. B1, EB

BRADDOCK

ME:LCC/8

(#) Apparent omission. Correction to follow.

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